Vaugh and Jeanne Keller v. Mr. and Mrs. John Olson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Vaugh and Jeanne Keller v. Mr. and Mrs. John
Olson : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dean H. Becker; Attorney for Appellant.
Kent L. Christiansen; Mueller and Christiansen; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Keller v. Olson, No. 890311 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1904






DOCKET NO. _32$mirCi*r 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN and JEANNE KELLER, 
Plaintiff and Appellants 
vs. 
MR. and MRS. JOHN OLSON 
Defendant and Respondents 
Civil No. 890311-CA 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal, Petition for Review from Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, Judge Young 
Attorney for Appellants: 
DEAN H. BECKER #261 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-531-0494 
Attorney for Respondents: 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN 
420 East South Temple 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN DEAN H. BECKER 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN and JEANNE KELLER, 
Plaintiff and Appellants 
vs. 
MR. and MRS. JOHN OLSON 
Defendant and Respondents 
Civil No. 890311-CA 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal, Petition for Review from Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, Judge Young 
Attorney for Appellants: 
DEAN H. BECKER #261 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-531-0494 
Attorney for Respondents: 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN 
420 East South Temple 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN DEAN H. BECKER 
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Attorney for Appellants; 
DEAN H. BECKER #261 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-531-0494 
Attorney for Respondents: 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN 
420 East South Temple 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Heading Page No. 
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 4 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . . . 5 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 7 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 11 
ARGUMENT 12 
CONCLUSION 20 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Asay v^ Rappleye, 593 P.2d 132 (1979) . . . . 5, 6, 12, 13, 14 
Cady v^ Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (1983) 6, 16, 17, 18 
Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738P.2dl052 (1987) 18, 19 
Management Committee, etc. v. Graystone Pines, 
652 P.2d 896 6, 13, 14 
Topik v^ Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 (1987) 6, 19 
Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care Center 
741 P.2d 969 (1987) 6, 14 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken pursuant to the authority of Rules 3 
and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and pursuant to 
the authority of Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3, paragraph 2(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. The issues for the decision of the Court of Appeals are: 
1. Did the trial court err in granting the Defendants1 
oral Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion of the 
Plaintiffs' testimony? 
2. Are there questions of fact upon which reasonable 
minds could differ which preclude the granting of the Directed 
Verdict by the trial Court? 
3. Did the Plaintiffs file the suit with the good 
faith expectation of prevailing on the merits? 
4. Does the action as filed by the Plaintiffs have 
merit? 
5. Was the trial court obligated to hear the testimony 
of the Defendants before determining that the weight of the 
circumstantial evidence was so insufficient as to grant a Motion 
for Directed Verdict? 
B. Standard of review 
1. For Directed Verdict: 
The 1979 case of Asay v^ Rappleye, 593 P.2d 132, in 
referring to the standard for judicial review of a directed 
verdict, states: 
In deciding a motion for directed verdict, the Court 
must consider the evidence in the light favorable to the 
party against whom it is directed; and unless in so doing 
there is no basis upon which reasonable minds acting 
fairly thereon could so find the issues as to entitle the 
plaintiff to recover, the motion should not be granted . . 
. . M. at 133. 
The standard for appellate review of a directed verdict is 
again set forth in the case of Management Committee, etc. v. 
Graystone Pines, 652 P.2d 896, 897-898 (1982): 
A directed verdict is only appropriate when the court 
is able to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable 
minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from 
the evidence presented. 
This Court's standard of review of a directed verdict 
is the same as that imposed upon the trial court. We must 
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that 
would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the 
directed verdict cannot be sustained. Ld. at 897-898. 
The Court is also referred to the Utah Court of Appeals case 
of Virginia S^ v^ Salt Lake Care Center 741 P.2d 969 (1987) which 
cites the above Graystone decision with approval. 
2. For Attorney's Fees: 
In the 1987 case of Topik v^_ Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, the 
Utah Supreme Court examined the issue of awarding attorney's fees 
for a "bad faith" filing, and cited to the 1983 case of Cady v. 
Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 for authority concerning the standard for 
the award of attorney's fees. Cady states that the court must 
find that the claim is both "without merit" Ld. at 151 and 
"lacking in good faith." Id. 
Therefore, the standard for awarding attorney's fees under 
Utah Code Section 78-27-56 states that the claim by the unsuc-
cessful party must be both "without merit" and "lacking in good 
faith." 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50(a), entitled Motion 
for directed verdict; when made, effect states: 
A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close 
of the evidence offerred by an opponent may offer evidence 
in the event that the motion is not granted, without 
having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent 
as if the motion had not been made. A motion for directed 
verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by 
jury even though all parties to the action have moved for 
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall 
state the specific ground(s) therefor. The order of the 
court granting a motion for a directed verdict is 
effective with any assent of the jury. 
The pertinent portion of Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code 
states as follows: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith . 
Finally, Section 78-38-3 of the Utah Code states: 
Any person who cuts down or carries off any wood or 
underwood, tree or timber, or girdles or otherwise injure 
any tree [or] timber on the land of another person, or on 
the street or highway in front of any person!s house, town 
or city lot, or cultivated grounds, or on the commons or 
public grounds of any city or town, or on the street or 
highway in front thereof, without lawful authority, is 
liable to the owner of such land, or to such city or town, 
for treble the amount of damages which may be assessed 
thereof in a civil action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The instant matter was filed by the Plaintiff alleging that 
the Defendants intentionally and maliciously poisoned and 
destroyed a row of spruce trees growing between the parties1 
property. The Defendants were further accused of trespassing on 
the property of the Plaintiffs and of violating the above Utah 
statute, Section 78-38-3. 
The matter was heard without jury before the Honorable Judge 
David Young in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County. At 
the conclusion of the Plaintiff's case, the Plaintiff rested, the 
Defendant moved for the entry of a directed verdict and the Court 
granted the Motion for Directed Verdict. Subsequently, the 
Defendant moved for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-27-56 and the Court granted such award of 
attorney's fees, but did not make any specific findings of fact 
concerning the award of attorney's fees. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Plaintiff Vaughn Keller obtained the subject property 
after the death of his father in 1983 (Appeal Transcript of 
Trial, referred to hereafter as T., page 1110, lines 22-23) and 
the death of his mother in 1984 (T., p. 118, 1. 8-9). Vaughan 
Keller's parents lived on the subject property which was a 
trailer home located in West Jordan, Utah, since approximately 
1960 (T. p. Ill, 1. 7-8) and had a good relationship with their 
neighbors, the Defendants (T., p. 27, 1. 18-22; p. 97, 1. 15-
18; p. 121, 1. 9-22). 
However, that "good" relationship deteriorated when the 
Keller's Blue Spruce trees which were planted directly between 
the parties' trailer homes started to become large and to shade 
the Defendant's lawn (T., p. 97, 1. 19-25; p. 98, 1. 1-3, 1. 13-
18, 25; p. 99, 1. 3-11). In fact, the Defendants became so 
concerned with the shading effect of the Blue Spruce trees that 
they went to the City of West Jordan to inquire concerning the 
existence of a "Sunshine Law" to prohibit the Kellers from 
blocking their sun. (T., p. 99, 1. 12-25; p. 100, 1. 1). West 
Jordan reportedly had no such law, but the Defendants trimmed the 
trees to their border nevertheless (T., p. 28, 1. 13-22; p. 100, 
1. 2-14; p. 114, 1. 23-25; p. 116, 1. 1-14) and the parties 
continued in their controversy. 
The Defendant, Mr. Olsen, became so upset regarding the 
trees that he severed his relationship with Mr. Keller, the 
father of Plaintiff Vaughn Keller, and threatened to take Mr. 
Keller to court to stop the trees from blocking their sun (T., p. 
100, 1. 15-25). 
Mr. Keller, the father, passed away in 1983, supra and Mrs. 
Keller, the mother, passed away in 1984, supra, and in early 
spring of 1985 the twelve Blue Spruce interspaced with eight 
shorter junipers (T., p. 11, 1. 21-23) began to die (T. p. 29, 1. 
9-12; p. 118, 1. 9-25; p. 119, 1. 1-3). Vaughn Keller, the 
Plaintiff, noticed at the time that the trees began to die that a 
new ditch, running parallel to the trailer and exactly the length 
of the trailers (T. p. 122, 1. 1-2, 18) had been dug between the 
property of the Kellers and Olsen, which ditch contained a "white 
substance." (T. p. 119, 1. 6-19). Concerned about the dying 
trees and the ditch with the white substance, Plaintiff Vaughn 
Keller went to the next door trailerhome of the Defendants and 
asked to speak to John Olsen, the Defendant. (T. p. 120, 1. 1-3). 
Defendant Mrs. Olsen stated that Plaintiff Vaughn Keller could 
not speak to her husband, and then stated, as testified by 
Plaintiff Vaughn Keller (T. p. 120, 1. 14-25): 
(Plaintiff): I asked her, I said, I would like to speak 
with John. 
(Attorney): Okay. 
(Plaintiff): And she said no, in that frame of voice, and 
I made eye contact with her and she just glaring at me and 
I just stood there and looked at her because it kind of 
startled me and she says, for your information, she says, 
our lawyer told us we could poison them trees on our side 
of the fence and, she says, and you get off our property. 
So I just started to back up. I never turned by back to 
her. I started backing up and she said, you're a damned 
lousey rotten coward too. 
Plaintiffs did attempt to analyze the soil with the "white" 
residue, but were informed that a soil test was ineffective for 
such problem and that any foreign substance put into the soil 
would dissipate as quickly as two weeks or as long as six months 
(T. p. 46, 1. 4-8) 
The property is surrounded by Blue Spruce and Juniper trees 
(T. p. 12, 1. 5-15; p. 14, 1. 2-4; p. 17, 1. 19-21, 22-23) and 
only the Blue Spruce and Juniper trees directly between the two 
properties are dead. In fact, while the remainder of the two 
properties is enhanced with lawn and gardens, nothing at all 
grows between the two properties where the ditch runs, (T. P. 18, 
1. 2-6, 16-22) even though the Defendants Olsen used to grow 
cantalopes between the trailers when the Kellers (parents) were 
alive (T. p. 90, 1. 5-14). 
At the trial of the matter, Plaintiff Vaughn Olsen testified 
that in his "right" opinion (T. p. 123, 1. 12) the reason that 
the trees died was that the Defendants killed the trees to do 
away with the shade (T. p. 123, 1. 15-24; p. 132, 1. 15-24; p. 
133, 1. 3-7). Plaintiff Jeanne Keller also testified that in her 
opinion, the Defendants Olsen had poisoned the trees with salt 
(T. p. 50, 1. 21-25; p. 51, 1. 1-5) 
Also testifying at the trial was an expert horticulturist, 
Miles Labrum, who stated that he had examined the trees to 
ascertain the reason for the death of the trees (T. p. 66, 1. 15-
17). Mr, Labrum conclusively stated that the reason for the 
death of the trees was not due to insect infestation (T. p. 67, 
1. 14-25); was not due to too much or too little water (T. p. 70, 
1. 23-25); was not due to too much heat (T. p. 91, 1. 10-22) and 
could only be the result of chemical action (T. p. 72, 1. 2-25; 
p. 73, 1. 1-7; p. 94, 1. 21-25; p. 95, 1. 1). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Plaintiffs1 state that the trial court did not properly apply 
the standard for the dismissal of an action to this case, for 
viewing the evidence objectively, it is certainly likely that 
reasonable minds could differ regarding an evaluation of the 
evidence before the Court as it existed at the conclusion of the 
Plaintiffs' case in chief. The Motion for Directed Verdict was 
improperly granted for the totality of the direct and 
circumstantial evidence, viewed objectively, certainly weighs in 
favor of the Plaintiffs and not against them. 
In addition, the award of attorney's fees to the Defendants 
pursuant to Utah's "Bad Faith1' statute is improper. Based upon 
the objective evidence under their control and as testified to by 
the Court; the expert witness testimony, and the totality of the 
circumstantial evidence, the case has merit and was further filed 
in good faith by the Plaintiffs with the expectation of recovery 
and with no purpose to delay, hinder or defraud the Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS1 ORAL 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
1. Case Law: The trial court granted the Defendants1 
oral Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion of the Plain-
tiffs1 case. The Findings of Fact signed by the Court simply 
state that the Plaintiffs "have failed to adduce evidence proving 
what actually caused the death of the Blue Spruce trees" and 
that the Plaintiffs "have failed to adduce evidence to prove that 
the Olsens intentionally, or otherwise, sought to poison or 
destroy the Blue Spruce trees or the lawn belonging to the 
Kellers." (Findings of Fact, paragraphs 7 and 8). 
The case law in Utah regarding the granting of a directed 
verdict specifically states that the trial court must consider 
all the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against 
whom the motion is directed. While there are a number of cases 
on the topic, the most recent cases found are Asay v. Rappleye, 
593 P.2d 132 (1979) which involved the Plaintiff, a building 
contractor, who sued the Defendants, homeowners, for work he 
undertook on the residence of the Defendants. The Plaintiff 
submitted into evidence a contract for the work to be performed, 
testified that the work had been completed, and further testified 
that the Defendant expressed her satisfaction with the work which 
was performed. 
At the conclusion of the Plaintiff's case, the Defendants 
moved for the issuance of a directed verdict which the Court 
granted. In reviewing the granting of the motion for directed 
verdict, the Supreme Court observed: 
In deciding a motion for directed verdict, the Court 
must consider the evidence in the light favorable to the 
party against whom it is directed; and unless in so doing 
there is no basis upon which reasonable minds acting 
fairly thereon could so find the issues as to entitle the 
plaintiff to recover, the motion should not be granted . . 
In view of the testimony of the plaintiff and his son 
that the work was completed . . . and the evidence that 
the plaintiff had not been paid therefor, it is apparent 
that there was a dispute as to whether the work had been 
completed in accordance with the terms of the contract . . 
. . Consequently, we are unable to see justification for 
the granting of defendants' motion for a directed verdict. 
IcL at 133. 
In Asay, the Supreme Court found that there was a dispute, 
and that reasonable minds could find issues to entitle the 
Plaintiff to recover, and that the directed verdict was not well 
taken. 
In the same vein is the 1982 case of Management Committee, 
Etc. v. Graystone Pines, 652 P.2d 896 which also involves 
construction matters, but the Plaintiff is suing the builder for 
defects in the building of condominiums. Plaintiff's purpose of 
existence was to maintain the common areas of the condominiums; 
leaks developed in the roof; Plaintiff hired an independent 
roofer to fix the leaks but the roof continued to leak; the 
parties hired their own experts who disagreed on the solution; 
and the foundation leaked and the parties various experts again 
testified contrary to one another. The trial court did not let 
the matter go to the jury, but granted the Defendant's motion for 
directed verdict. 
The Supreme Court ruled that: 
The foregoing evidence raised substantial issues 
of fact as to the alleged defects that could only be 
determined by the jury as fact-finder. Therefore, it was 
error for the trial judge to rule against plaintiff, as a 
matter of law, and to direct a verdict in favor of 
defendants. Id. at 899. 
And why was it error to rule against the plaintiff? The 
Court set out its standard on directed verdicts as follows: 
A directed verdict is only appropriate when the court is 
able to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable 
minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from 
the evidence presented. 
This Courtfs standard of review of a directed verdict 
is the same as that imposed upon a trial court. We must 
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing pary,, and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that 
would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the 
directed verdict cannot be sustained. IcL at 897-898. 
The Court therefore affirms its previous ruling in Asay, 
supra, and confirms that a directed verdict must not be granted 
if "reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be 
determined from the evidence submitted1' supra. 
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals cites the above Graystone 
Pines decision with approval in the 1987 case of Virginia S. v. 
Salt Lake Care Center, 741 P.2d 969, 971. 
2. Application of the Facts to the Law: 
In determining whether the directed verdict should have been 
rendered against the Plaintiff in the above matter, the standard 
set by ;the Utah appellate Courts, i.e.: 
i. examine the evidence in light most favorable to 
losing party; 
ii. must be reasonable basis in: 
a. evidence; and 
b. inferences 
iii. so that reasonable minds could differ on the facts, 
must be adhered to in this matter. 
Did the Plaintiff establish evidence and inferences so that 
reasonable minds could differ? The answer must be in the 
affirmative in light of the following testimony and proof offered 
at the trial by the parties, lay witnesses and an expert witness: 
i. The lot was surrounded by Blue Spruce and Juniper 
trees which, until early spring of 1985, were all in good health, 
ii. In early spring of 1985, only those twelve Blue 
Spruce, interspersed with eight Junipers, which set directly 
between the two housetrailers and which directly shaded the 
Defendants1 housetrailer, showed signs of discoloration. At no 
time have any of the other Blue Spruce surrounding the lot showed 
any signs of death or disease. 
iii. When the Plaintiff asked to see Mr. John Olsen 
concerning the discoloration of the trees, Mrs. Olsen, stated to 
the Plaintiff, Vaughn Olson, "Our attorney told us we could 
poison the trees." 
iv. The trees continued to discolor and die, but only 
those twenty trees between the trailers and directly next to a 
ditch in which was found a "white substance" by the Plaintiffs. 
v. The parents of Vaughn Keller and the Defendants 
Olsen were very good friends and neighbors until controversy 
arose concerning the growth of the Blue Spruce and the shading it 
produced on the Defendant Olsens* property, at which time the 
neighbors became rather vitrolic towards one another, even to the 
extent that a lawsuit was threatened by the Defendants to take 
out the offending shade trees. 
vi. The Plaintiffs1 expert, Miles Labrum, examined the 
trees, and concluded that insects did not cause the death of the 
trees, water stress did not cause the death of the trees, heat 
did not cause the death of the trees, but chemical action did 
cause the death of the trees. 
vii. A ditch exists between the properties, which ditch 
first appeared in early 1985 and which has a "white substance" on 
the surface of the ditch. Prior to the time of the ditch and 
the controversy, cantalopes grew well in the location, but at the 
present time, and since spring of 1985, nothing grows between the 
two trailers. 
3. Conclusion: It is undeniable that the Plaintiffs 
presented sufficient evidence and inferences for reasonable minds 
to differ on the facts as determined by the evidence. The Court 
clearly erred in granting the motion for directed verdict, and 
the decision must be reversed and remanded for trial. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
THE DEFENDANTS FOR AN ALLEGED "BAD FAITH" FILING 
1. Case Law: 
The leading Utah case establishing the standards under which 
to determine an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code 
Section 78-27-56 is Cady v^ _ Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (1983). 
The case involves Plaintiffs who received from the 
Defendants cash and a written Earnest Money offer on real proper-
ty. The Defendants did not complete the sa le , the P l a i n t i f f s 
re ta ined the downpayment of f ive hundred dol lars and then sued 
for the real es ta te commission and expenses in r e se l l i ng the 
residence. The cause of act ion for expenses in r e se l l i ng the 
residence was dismissed at t r i a l by Plaint iffs ' own motion, and 
the cause of action for real estate commissions was dismissed by 
the Court. Upon motion by the Defendants, the t r i a l court 
then awarded Defendants t he i r a t torney 's fees pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-27-56 for pursuing "meri t less" act ions and for 
s t a t i ng to the t r i a l judge that there would be mater ia l issues 
presented at the t r i a l when in fact there were no material issues 
presented at the t r i a l . 
In addressing the issue of the award of a t torney 's fees, 
the Court f i r s t s t a t e s that the s t a t u t e was not meant to "be 
applied to a l l prevai l ing pa r t i e s in a l l c i v i l su i t s . " Cady at 
151, and that two elements must be present before attorney's fees 
are awarded under the "bad faith" statute. First , the claim must 
be "without merit" which the Court defines as "bordering on 
f r i v o l i t y , " Id. at 151, meaning "of l i t t l e weight or importance 
having no basis in law or fact." W[. 
The second determination which must be made is whether the 
" p l a i n t i f f ' s conduct in bringing the sui t was lacking in good 
faith" Ld. And as ably defined by the Court, "good faith" is 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the ac t iv i t ies 
in ques t ion ; (2) no i n t e n t to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of 
the fact that the a c t i v i t i e s in question wi l l [ s ic ] 
hinder, delay or defraud others. 
To establish lack of good faith, one must prove that 
one or more of these factors is lacking. 
In other words, not only must there be substantial 
evidence that the claim was lacking basis in either law or 
fact and therefore frivolous, but there must be sufficient 
evidence that the unsuccessful party lacked at least one 
of the good faith elements heretofore stated. 
IcL at 151-152 
In 1987, the Utah Court of Appeals cited Cady, supra with 
approval in the matter of Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 
(1987) and affirmed a finding by the trial court that the 
defendant's actions in the boundary dispute matter did have some 
degree of merit, even if ultimately unsuccessful, and that there 
was no justification for an award of attorney's fees. 
However, in a case handed down the following day, the Utah 
Court of Appeals, again citing Cady, supra, with approval, found 
in the matter of Topik v^ Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 (1987), that 
attorney's fees were justified as the defendant lied ("tesfified 
falsely") on the stand and presented a defense which was 
partially in "bad faith." 
2. Application of the Facts to the Law: 
Again, the standard set forth to justify awarding attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party under Cady, supra is: 
i. the case must be "without merit," meaning 
"bordering on frivolity;" and 
ii. the conduct of the losing party must be lacking in 
good faith, which good faith is: 
a. honest belief in the case; 
b. no intent to take unconscionable advantage of 
others; and 
c. no intent to hinder, delay or defraud. 
Thus the question for the instant Court is whether the 
Kellers1 case was without merit and, finding such, was it not 
filed in good faith. 
Addressing first the issue of the relative merit of the 
case, the Plaintiffs plainly testified that: 
i. The trees began to change color; 
ii. A "white substance" was observed in a new ditch 
running parallel to the discolored trees; 
iii. Mrs. Olsen directly stated that her attorney told 
them they could poison the trees on their side of the property; 
iv. The trees did die, but only those particular trees 
located directly between the trailers and not the other 
numerous, same species trees surrounding the property of the 
Plaintiff; 
v. An expert testified that the trees were not killed 
by insects or overwatering or heat, but by a "chemical 
substance." 
The weight of the testimony, if only for the purpose of 
determining the issue of attorney's fees, indicates that the case 
indeed does have merit, is not frivolous, and does have a strong 
basis in fact. Viewed objectively, there is the strong likelihood 
that the Plaintiffs could prevail before a trier of fact, thus 
invalidating any contention that the matter has no merit. 
However, for argument's sake, (without admitting such) 
assuming that the matter did not have any merit, the next 
question is whether the matter is lacking in good faith. 
Plaintiff Vaughn Olsen testified that in his "right" supra 
opinion, the Defendants killed the trees and Plaintiff Jeanne 
Keller also testified that it was her belief that the trees were 
poisoned by the Defendants. There is no testimony of any nature 
which proves or alleges that the Plaintiffs intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of others or that they attempted to 
hinder, delay or defraud anyone. 
Thus, not one of the three above-mentioned elements of good 
faith were proved lacking, and the standard for the award of 
attorneyfs fees is not met. 
Without question, the action was filed in good faith by the 
Plaintiffs who believed and continue to believe that the matter 
does have merit, and that there are no grounds whatsoever for the 
granting of attorney's fees in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs pray that the Court set aside the Order of 
Dismissal and the award of attorney's fees, and remand this 
matter to the trial court for a new hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this day July, 1990. 
DEAN H. BECKER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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